The Tragedy of TRIPS by Gerhart, Peter M.
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Publications 
2007 
The Tragedy of TRIPS 
Peter M. Gerhart 
Case Western University School of Law, pmg2@case.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Gerhart, Peter M., "The Tragedy of TRIPS" (2007). Faculty Publications. 157. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/157 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
  
THE TRAGEDY OF TRIPS 
Peter M. Gerhart* 
2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................. 143 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 144 
I.  THE DYNAMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICYMAKING ........... 148 
A.  National Policymaking ................................................................ 148 
B.  International Policymaking .......................................................... 155 
1.   Nation-States Seek Wealth, Not Balance .............................. 155 
2. International Lawmaking is by Negotiation, Not Interest 
Brokering .............................................................................. 157 
3.   International Systems Do Not Deal Well with Distributive  
      Issues ..................................................................................... 158 
4. Positive Externalities are Not Necessarily Disincentives to 
Investment ............................................................................. 162 
5. The Exchange Model Does Not Work for International 
Intellectual Property ............................................................. 167 
II.  REALIGNING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ...................................... 171 
A.  The Possible Solutions ................................................................. 175 
1.  The Redistributive Solutions .................................................. 175 
a.  A Redistributive Tax ........................................................ 176 
b.  An International Fund for Innovation .............................. 177 
2.  The Bargaining Solutions ...................................................... 178 
B.  The Practicality of Solutions ........................................................ 180 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 183 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This Article argues that sound intellectual property policy requires not 
only that the policymaker establish an appropriate incentive for invention 
  
 * Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve School of Law and Case’s Weather-
head School of Business.  Many thanks to Professor Jerome Reichman for his encouragement 
and to the participants at the Michigan State College of Law Conference on The Internation-
al Intellectual Property Regime Complex for their comments. 
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but also that the policymaker determine how the cost of that incentive 
should be distributed across various classes of consumers.  It is the distribu-
tive dimension of intellectual property policy that makes existing interna-
tional institutions such an unsound mechanism for determining global rules 
for intellectual policy—the policymakers are simply not able to make the 
appropriate kinds of decisions.  I suggest some ways in which institutional 
structures can be modified to achieve a better balance. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article supports the following claim: the tragedy of TRIPS1 is 
that the process of international lawmaking has distorted global policy to-
ward intellectual property by forcing policymaking through an institutional 
framework that is ill suited to the task.  We have an institutional mismatch 
between the needs of an intelligent global policy for intellectual property 
and the institutions available for the task.  As a result, our vision of the field 
is distorted, we no longer ask the correct questions, and our conception of 
intellectual property itself is undergoing a radical and negative transfor-
mation.  We need to explore, as I do here, new institutional mechanisms for 
creating and adjusting global policy toward innovation and knowledge 
goods.2 
  
 1. TRIPS is the acronym for the treaty covering the intellectual property obliga-
tions of members of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  See Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uru-
guay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].  It was included as part 
of the comprehensive set of treaties that resulted from the WTO’s Uruguay Round of Negoti-
ations. 
 2. Although this Article focuses on TRIPS and the international intellectual proper-
ty regime made through the WTO, much of what I say is equally relevant to the intellectual 
property regime administered by the international agency that specializes in intellectual 
property, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).  My analysis concentrates on 
the WTO, rather than WIPO, because the WTO has two characteristics that significantly 
distinguish its policymaking machinery from that of WIPO.  First, the WTO has the ability to 
bargain across sectors, so that one country can agree to change its intellectual property poli-
cies for another country’s agreement to changes policies in a different economic sector.  The 
WTO’s ability to embed intellectual property laws in a broad array of policy obligations 
makes the harmonization of intellectual property law politically feasible and allows the in-
dustrial countries to insist that countries accept intellectual property rules in order to get the 
benefits of WTO membership.  WIPO, by contrast, is a single-issue institution and countries 
can choose which of the WIPO intellectual property treaties to adopt.  Second, through its 
dispute settlement system, the WTO, but not WIPO, can impose costs on countries that do 
not comply with their treaty obligations.  This makes it harder for a country to evade its 
obligations under TRIPS, whereas in the WIPO regime each country decides for itself 
whether it complies with the WIPO treaties it has adopted. 
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This Article confronts the distributive issues that are inherent in the 
design of intellectual property systems, not only the distributive issues be-
tween industrial and developing countries3 but also the distributive issues 
within each country.  Unlike other commentators, I question the model on 
which much of the economic analysis of intellectual property policy is 
based, and I recommend new institutional structures for determining inter-
national policy toward intellectual property policy and suggest how and 
why those structures might be realized. 
This Article not only adds important perspectives to the burgeoning 
literature on international intellectual property, it also adds to the broader 
literature on international relations and international law.  Because my per-
spective is institutional and policy-oriented, it does not argue from the 
viewpoint of international law.  Nonetheless, the Article seeks to enhance 
our understanding of international law by enhancing our understanding of 
how institutional structures make a difference in determining the content of 
international law.  Whereas a public international lawyer might refer to the 
requirements of international law that relate to the rights of the poor, this 
Article seeks to find a way to implement those requirements through institu-
tional design.  Whereas a human rights lawyer might reference the concepts 
of justice that require that the poor have access to the products of the intel-
lectual property system, my emphasis is to find a way to build human rights 
values into the institutional structure that gives rise to international law. 
Let me first place this Article in the context of the existing literature 
on international intellectual property policy, which has grown enormously 
in the ten years since the TRIPS agreement was adopted.4  Although the 
literature is quite diverse, the theoretical, evaluative literature generally re-
volves around two topics: efficacy and fairness.5  The efficacy literature 
  
 3. For an important exploration of distributive issues in international intellectual 
property, see Eyal Benvenisti & George Downs, Distributive Politics and International Insti-
tutions: The Case of Drugs, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 21 (2005). 
 4. For recent major contributions to this type of literature, see INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIME (Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS]; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH (Carston Fink & Keith Maskus eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT].  For a recent comprehensive review of major trends and 
literature, see Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual 
Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323 (2004). 
 5. A third topic—what we might call rights-based justifications for intellectual 
property—suggests that owners of intellectual property have a right to profit from their in-
ventive activity, quite apart from an economic or technological rationale for creating the 
property.  See, e.g., ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT 
(1990) (emphasizing rights of IP owners to be protected against theft or piracy, in addition to 
the positive benefits of IP for development).  For reasons that are made apparent in the text, 
the rights based literature is unattractive because it yields no basis for determining the opti-
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seeks to determine the impact of TRIPS on various indicia of national wel-
fare.  It examines, for example, the impact of TRIPS on royalty payments, 
foreign direct investment, technology transfer, and innovation.  Insofar as 
the literature focuses on developing countries, the debate focuses on wheth-
er intellectual property is good for development.6  Insofar as the literature 
focuses on industrial countries, it seeks to determine how international sys-
tems can be more efficient,7 and whether international constraints hamper 
national innovation.8 
By and large, the literature relies on highly indeterminate evidence.9  
The way an analyst reads and interprets the evidence is quite subjective; it 
often depends on whether the analyst adopts the perspective of an intellec-
tual property owner or an intellectual property user—which is to say the 
perspective of a country that exports knowledge goods or of a country that 
imports knowledge goods.10 
The fairness literature focuses less on the effects of TRIPS as it per-
tains to national welfare, and more on the fairness of the bargaining that led 
to intellectual property harmonization and minimum standards through 
TRIPS.  The critical literature stresses how much developing countries gave 
up when they accepted TRIPS standards, as well as perceived imperfections 
  
mum scope of protection for intellectual property.  Of course, rights-based justifications form 
a large part of the public discourse about intellectual property, and many people almost re-
flexively believe that the foreign use of knowledge generated in the United States is theft.  
This reflexive understanding ignores the fact that intellectual property is itself the product of 
human invention, requiring reasons for its creation and scope.  See generally ROBERT L. 
OSTERGARD, JR., THE DEVELOPMENT DILEMMA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (2003).  
 6. See, e.g., United Nations Development Programme, Making Global Trade Work 
for People (2003), available at http://www.undp.org/dpa/publications/globaltrade.pdf. 
 7. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 693-700 (2002). 
 8. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International 
Intellectual Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 431 (2004) 
[hereinafter Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property] (analyzing the ef-
fects of TRIPS on ability of the United States to preserve open information for research); 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE. W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 95 (2004) [hereinafter Dinwoodie & 
Dreyfuss, TRIPS Dynamics] (analyzing freedom of a country to decrease protection along 
one dimension while decreasing protection along a different dimension).   
 9. The evidence is carefully presented and evaluated in KEITH E. MASKUS, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000).   
 10. See, e.g., Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual 
Property Rights and Development Policy, Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights (2002), available at 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf [hereinafter CIPR 
Report] (assessing international IP systems from standpoint of developing countries). 
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in the bargaining process.11  The supportive literature stresses the reciprocal 
promises that developing countries were given in return for their allegiance 
to TRIPS.12  More recently, the central issue has been the attempt by the 
United States and Europe to go outside the multilateral trading context to 
embed a “TRIPS plus” regime in a series of unilateral, bilateral, and region-
al initiatives.13  The evidence on fairness issues, because it is conflicting, 
also yields no clear conclusions. 
The two literatures are related, of course.  The efficacy literature seeks 
to evaluate the substantive impact of TRIPS and to either support or criti-
cize TRIPS by calculating its impact on some measure of national welfare.  
The fairness literature seeks to assess the process by which TRIPS standards 
have been made and revised and to make some claims about the normative 
quality of that process.  Because substance and process are so intertwined, 
each literature can draw on the other.  Evidence of the negative impact of 
TRIPS supports the notion that the process for negotiating TRIPS was 
faulty, and evidence of its positive impact supports the notion that the bar-
gaining that led to TRIPS was, at worst, benign.   
The two literatures share one perspective.  Both the efficacy literature 
and the fairness literature assume that our normative evaluation of TRIPS 
can be determined by assessing TRIPS in the context of the nation-state.  
We think of fairness in terms of whether the TRIPS negotiations were fair to 
this or that country, and we measure the effect of TRIPS by looking at its 
impact on this or that country.14  It is as if we assumed that we could under-
stand TRIPS as the sum of its effects on the nation-states of the world. 
In this Article, I hope to supplement our understanding of international 
intellectual property by focusing on the institutional structure through which 
global policy is made.  In particular, I advocate a global perspective on the 
  
 11. The debate is summarized in Peter M. Gerhart, Special Introduction, Reflections:  
Beyond Compliance Theory—TRIPS as a Substantive Issue, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 357 
(2000).  For two critical views from political scientists, see SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, 
PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); MICHAEL 
RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (1995).  The World Bank suggests that the payoff the developing countries ex-
pected from endorsing TRIPS has not been forthcoming.  WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 37-64 (2001). 
 12. BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO 152-53 (1995). 
 13. A TRIPS-plus regime seeks to enhance the international obligations that coun-
tries undertake through international treaties.  See, e.g., Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilat-
eralism in Intellectual Property, 4 WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001); Ruth L. Okediji, Back 
to Bilaterlism?  Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. 
OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 127 (2004). 
 14. See, e.g., KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 145 (2005) (referring to studies done in China and Lebanon, and continually bas-
ing analysis on circumstances in individual countries). 
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welfare effects of various alternative intellectual property regimes.15  Be-
cause the current debate assumes that the nation-state is the correct locus for 
making and implementing global policy, it has missed the important ques-
tion of whether nation-state interaction can ever achieve an appropriate bal-
ance.  In other words, the nation-state is the problem underlying TRIPS, not 
the source of a solution, for any policy made through the existing interaction 
of nation-states can never achieve the requisite balance.  If I am correct that 
intellectual property made through the nation-state will not achieve the req-
uisite balance, then we need to consider institutional designs that will har-
ness the interests of the nation-state to improve global public policy toward 
intellectual property. 
This Article comes in two parts.  Part I, the diagnostic part, supports 
my claim that international institutions distort global policy toward goods 
covered by intellectual property that is, knowledge goods.  There, I set out a 
model of intellectual property policymaking in the domestic context and 
then show how the dynamics of lawmaking through nation-states make it 
impossible to achieve the requisite balance in the global production and 
distribution of knowledge goods.  Part II, the prescriptive part, suggests 
institutional changes that would move the system of nation-states into a 
policymaking role that is more likely to achieve an appropriate balance and 
explains the forces that might bring about those institutional changes. 
I.  THE DYNAMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICYMAKING 
My analysis flows from a model of intellectual policymaking at the 
national level.  On the whole, the model is fairly conventional, but I elabo-
rate on the conventional model by pointing out the distributive dimensions 
of intellectual property that generally are ignored.  This conventional model 
is articulated in Part A, followed by an analysis in Part B of how policymak-
ing distorts important aspects of this model when nation-states seek to make 
policy for intellectual property across borders. 
A.  National Policymaking 
The goal of any intellectual property system is to induce investment in 
knowledge goods that are valuable to society but that would otherwise not 
be made because knowledge can so easily be copied and its value appropri-
  
 15. For a notable effort to model the production of knowledge goods as a global 
system—one that implicitly takes into account distributive concerns, see Keith E. Maskus & 
Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization 
of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 309-16 (2004). 
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ated.16  The system creates property rights to allow the producer of 
knowledge goods to recoup investment in the goods by limiting the uncom-
pensated spillover benefits from the knowledge.17   
Intellectual property policy therefore requires a trade-off between the 
positive incentive effects of creating and protecting property in knowledge 
goods and the adverse effects of restricting consumer access to knowledge 
goods.18  An appropriate balance requires that access to the knowledge 
goods be in the control of the property owner up to the point at which the 
last dollar of return to the innovator from the right to exclude others just 
equals the marginal value of new innovation that would not otherwise be 
undertaken.19  This balance can be achieved by varying the nature of the 
property along several dimensions:20 the policymaker can vary the subject 
matter, the prerequisites for acquiring the property, the length of protection, 
  
 16. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 247 (1994).  
 17. See Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Eco-
nomics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (1991). 
 18. These adverse effects include the higher prices that consumers must pay for 
knowledge goods covered by patents and copyrights and protection “that [can] choke access 
to upstream information inputs – including scientific and technical data as such – [in ways 
that] could narrow access to the research commons and limit other transfer mechanisms, with 
incalculable long-term effects . . . .”  Maskus & Reichman, supra note 15, at 290-91.  See 
also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is 
this Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 9 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).  
The importance of access to knowledge in order to foster world growth was emphasized in 
the reports from the World Summit on the Information Society.  See World Summit on the 
Information Society, Declaration of Principles (Dec. 12, 2003), 
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/md/03/wsis/doc/S03-WSIS-DOC-0004!!PDF-E.pdf. 
 19. This portrayal of the trade-off is different from that used by many economists.  
To many economists, the cost of an IP system is the surplus that is foregone because the 
property owner is allowed to restrict output and raise prices—the so-called deadweight loss.  
See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL 
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969); F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Opti-
mal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1972).  In my por-
trayal, the “cost” of an IP system is the consumer surplus that is transferred from consumers 
to producers because of the producer’s ability to restrict output.  My portrayal thus envisions 
the intellectual property system as a kind of tax system in which the producer is given a 
limited opportunity to tax consumers in order to recoup investment costs.  See CIPR Report, 
supra note 10 (discussing how “non-exclusive licensing is a tax on users of technology”).  
Although deadweight loss and transferred consumer surplus are two outcomes from the 
restriction on output, they will not be the same.  Economists who see deadweight loss to be 
the cost of IP are likely to see lower costs than those who see the cost of the IP system to be 
higher prices that consumers pay.  Naturally, a poorly designed IP system can impose other 
costs on society, including consumer payments for knowledge goods that would have been 
produced even in the absence of an IP system, and restrictions on future innovation if broad 
IP rights preclude the use of important information for future innovation.   
 20. On the scope of protection, see generally Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, On 
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).   
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the scope of protection (that is, the test for infringement), the test for per-
missible use of the property (for example, fair use or compulsory licensing), 
the competitive system within which the property rights are exercised, and 
the nature of the enforcement system (including penalties and enforcement 
costs).21  Within the dimensions that the policymaker has set, the intellectual 
property system works by harnessing the market system.  People who want 
to use the property pay for it, and their payment registers their preferences 
for this property over any other property (including savings), given their 
ability to pay for the property. 
The exact intellectual property system that will induce socially appro-
priate investment without unnecessary distortions depends on two factors: 
(1) the process for developing and distributing knowledge goods, and (2) 
the extent to which markets award sufficient first mover advantages (by 
rewarding those who get to the market first) to induce innovators to develop 
and distribute knowledge goods even without property protection.22  Moreo-
ver, intellectual property systems are not the only way to induce valuable 
investment in innovation.  Government or charitable subsidy for research is 
a substitute or supplemental way to induce investment, and over a large 
range of knowledge goods government funded research is often the source 
of knowledge that gets incorporated into knowledge goods.23  A policymak-
er who wants to address the failure of the market to induce appropriate in-
vestment can choose between a property system and a subsidy system.24 The 
two systems have unique advantages and disadvantages.25 
  
 21. See, e.g., Carlos Correa, Managing the Provision of Knowledge: The Design of 
Intellectual Property Laws, in PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 410 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 
2003).  The various elements of intellectual property law that make up these several dimen-
sions are described in any good text on intellectual property law.  See generally DONALD S. 
CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (1992). 
 22. Intellectual property regimes are often a blunt instrument for achieving this 
balance because conditions differ across industries and technologies.   
 23. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003). 
 24. This underappreciated point—the substitutability of the two systems of incen-
tives—is a central part of the analysis in Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political Economy of Intel-
lectual Property Treaties, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 415, 417 (2004) [hereinafter Scotchmer, 
Political Economy]; Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It 
the Best Incentive System?, 2 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 51 (2002); Stephen M. Maurer & 
Suzanne Scotchmer, Procuring Knowledge, in 15 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND 
GROWTH 1 (2004). 
 25. A subsidy system spreads the burdens of the system among taxpayers, who may 
or may not benefit from the investment.  The distribution of the burden depends on the tax 
rate.  The subsidy can directly target certain fields for investment but is not subject to any 
penalty if the investment turns out not to be beneficial.  A property system spreads the bur-
dens of the system among those who buy the knowledge goods, and thus spreads the burden 
based on consumer preferences (given the ability of consumers to pay).  It cannot induce 
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This two-dimensional model—the need to balance incentives and ac-
cess—presents a fairly standard picture of the choices that inform intellec-
tual property policy.  Another important factor, however, is generally not 
given the recognition that it deserves—namely, distributive values.26  Be-
cause the intellectual property system uses the market to generate the re-
ward for investment in knowledge goods, the system absorbs the market’s 
agnosticism about ability to pay.  A two-dimensional property system as-
sumes that ability to pay is not a relevant matter for consideration when the 
system is designed. 
However, the question of what to do with consumers whose need is 
great but whose ability to pay is limited (that is, the distributive question) is 
an important part of the design of intellectual property systems.  Although 
we are used to thinking of intellectual property as a system of incentives 
designed to correct the appropriability problem (and, therefore, as an effi-
ciency-enhancing system), distributive issues are inherent in intellectual 
property design.27  Naturally, the initial issue of intellectual property law is 
how to get the incentives right; but once the appropriate incentives are iden-
tified, the distributive question asks who should pay for those incentives and 
what influence a consumer’s ability to pay (that is, existing wealth) should 
have on choosing who should pay.28  That distributive question is analytical-
ly distinct from the issue of how much incentive we must provide to get an 
efficient level of investment in inventive activity.  In other words, intellec-
tual property design requires a two-step process.  First, we must decide how 
much incentive to provide.  Second, we must separately determine whether 
we obtain that incentive from one group of consumers or another.29 
As I will argue in a moment, intellectual property law sometimes takes 
distributive considerations into account by providing access based on ability 
to pay.  However, this is hardly the exclusive means by which policymakers 
in national systems are influenced by distributive concerns.  First, national 
  
investment that is not projected to yield a profit under current rules of intellectual property 
but, by punishing those who make non-remunerative investments, enforces a kind of disci-
pline on investment decisions.  
 26. The discussion of distributive values is drawn from Peter M. Gerhart, Distribu-
tive Values and Institutional Design in the Provision of Global Public Goods, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 69 (Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds., 2005). 
 27. Economists have recognized that although there is a unique stream of revenue 
that is associated with an efficient level of investment, there are a large variety of ways that a 
stream of revenue can be collected.  Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, International 
Protection of Intellectual Property, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1635, 1637 (2004).   
 28. See Scotchmer, Political Economy, supra note 24, at 415. 
 29. Margaret Chon makes much of the same point by arguing that international 
intellectual property should be infused with a norm of substantive equality that takes distri-
butional concerns into account.  See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Develop-
ment Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2813, 2821 (2006). 
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intellectual property systems are enacted against the backdrop of national 
systems of redistribution that shift the cost of access from poor users to the 
general community or even to rights owners.30  This is an obvious point, but 
one that is often overlooked.  In fact, we can go further, speculating that the 
freedom of policymakers to enact efficient systems for intellectual property, 
without regard to their distributive values, is enhanced by the knowledge 
that a strong social protection network will preserve access for those who 
are unable to pay for the knowledge goods. 
Second, in national systems, our choice between a property system 
and a subsidy system depends not only on the nature of the inventive activi-
ty, but also on whether we want taxpayers or users (or both) to pay for the 
incentive.31  We can choose publicly supported research when the benefits 
of the research are likely to be diffuse enough to justify asking taxpayers to 
fund it.  Public support for cancer research is an example.  Where the bene-
fits are more focused, we can induce the research by granting property 
rights in it; this distributes the cost of the research among those who benefit 
from it.  The choice between the two systems therefore turns in part on how 
we want to distribute the burden of paying the needed incentive. 
Third, price discrimination is a way by which distributive concerns 
can be taken into account.  By selling at lower prices to consumers with 
little wealth and at higher prices to consumers with greater wealth, a proper-
ty owner can assure that the return will in fact reflect the ability of consum-
ers to pay for the property.32  Any government policy that facilitates such 
price discrimination—perhaps by helping the property owner disrupt the 
  
 30. Governments can achieve such redistribution through direct transfer payments, 
by harnessing governmental purchasing power to drive prices down or by using price con-
trols to guarantee access.  Many industrialized countries, for example, impose price controls 
on patented prescription drugs.  See Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Phar-
maceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remain-
ing WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
1069, 1074 (1996).  Even in the United States, the federal government requires drug compa-
nies seeking Medicaid payments to provide rebates on Medicaid sales of some drugs.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 1396(r) (2000).  The United States Supreme Court upheld a Maine statute requiring 
even greater rebates.  See Pharm. Research & Mfgs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003).   
 31. In the United States, after the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-204 
(2000), there is a mixed system in which the federal government funds much university 
research but allows the universities to patent these research results for themselves.  This is an 
explicit attempt to distribute some of the cost of the incentive to taxpayers and some of the 
costs to consumers.  
 32. Frederick M. Abbott, First Report (Final) to the Committee on International 
Trade Law of the International Law Association on the Subject of Parallel Importation, 1 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 607 (1998); Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse, Theory and Implementa-
tion of Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 425 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005).   
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arbitrage possibilities that would make the discrimination costly33—is en-
hancing the ability of the intellectual property system to respond to distribu-
tive goals. 
Finally, as I have already acknowledged, distributive values are some-
times built into the design of intellectual property systems themselves, for 
intellectual property law often provides users with access to intellectual 
property that reflects the user’s lack of financial resources relative to need.34  
Compulsory licensing is an obvious attempt to override normal property 
rights in order to reflect the impact of the denial of access to those who 
would have difficulty paying.  Moreover, intellectual property systems high-
light distributive concerns in less dramatic ways.  For example, the exhaus-
tion doctrine in copyright law gave us lending libraries and thus supported 
the distributive goal of providing access to those who could not otherwise 
pay for copyrighted literary property.35 
In view of these distributive values, the balance that must be drawn 
when designing any intellectual property system involves three, not two, 
variables: the incentive variable (getting the right incentive for the efficient 
investment in innovation), the access variable (not unduly restricting access 
by overprotecting the intellectual property), and the distributive variable 
(determining how to distribute the burden of paying for the innovation 
among potential users).  Moreover, because a subsidy system presents an 
  
 33. Arbitrage occurs when someone buys the products in the low priced market and 
sells them in the high priced market.  This breaks down price discrimination by making it 
harder to sustain the prices in the high priced market and by reducing the incentive and abil-
ity to maintain lower prices in the low-priced market.  Arbitrage can be disrupted by any 
means that keeps the markets separate, including contractual restrictions on resale, product 
differentiation that make resale expensive, and government prohibitions on resale.  In the 
international arena, the debate over whether countries should allow the importation of 
knowledge goods legitimately marketed abroad—the so-called exhaustion or parallel import 
issue—turns on various views about the benefits and detriments of arbitrage in the interna-
tional system.  See CIPR Report, supra note 10; Alexander J. Stack, TRIPS, Patent Exhaus-
tion and Parallel Imports, 1 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 657 (1998); Richard P. Rozek & Rich-
ard T. Rapp, Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals: The Impact on Welfare and Innovation, 7 J. 
ECON. INTEGRATION 181 (1992); Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disa-
gree: The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 333 (2000). 
 34. TRIPS itself builds in flexibilities in the obligations that WTO members under-
take in order to recognize that optimal policies will vary from country to country.  See J.H. 
Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS 
Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 28 (concluding that “the TRIPS Agreement 
leaves developing countries ample ‘wiggle room’ in which to implement national policies 
favoring the public interest in free competition”); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 (2001) (highlighting the 
“constructive ambiguit[ies]” in TRIPS).  Because these flexibilities provide countries with 
enhanced opportunities for access to knowledge goods that often reflect the country’s wealth, 
these flexibilities can be considered distributive.   
 35. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 8.13 (4th ed. 2005). 
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alternative way of dealing with the appropriability problem, the three varia-
bles of an intellectual property system must then be compared with the way 
the variables work themselves out in the alternative system of government 
subsidy. 
Naturally, the balance that any country strikes between these various 
considerations depends on both the political and the social systems of the 
country.  The political system matters because, in practice, the ability of any 
stakeholder to influence the outcome of the process depends on that stake-
holder’s ability to influence the process.36  The social system matters be-
cause the balance of the various factors will depend on the country’s capaci-
ty for innovation, the quality of the market, the legal system, and so forth. 
In general, based on this analysis we can think of the intellectual prop-
erty balance as the result of a struggle between knowledge producers (who 
want to increase incentives) and knowledge consumers (who want to pre-
serve access), as well as between various classes of consumers or taxpayers 
(to determine what portion of the incentive each pays for).37  Producers and 
consumers have shared interests in the sense that even knowledge consum-
ers are willing to pay for beneficial innovations that would not otherwise 
occur, but they diverge when one considers that knowledge consumers do 
not want to pay any more than is necessary to induce that investment, while 
knowledge producers want to maximize the returns on their investment.  On 
the distributive front, impecunious consumers would like to pay as little as 
possible to the producers, and wealthy consumers want to make sure that 
every consumer that uses the knowledge good contributes a fair share to its 
production. 
Perhaps the best policy analogy, therefore, is to think of an intellectual 
property system as a form of a tax system.  All observers agree that a tax 
system is a necessary way of financing investment that would not otherwise 
take place through the market (that is, investment in public goods), but eve-
ryone also agrees that the need to finance public goods is finite.  And every 
  
 36. The intellectual property field is therefore ripe for public choice theories, which 
emphasize the inclination of governments to respond more readily to producer interests than 
consumers’ interests and to the interests of institutional consumers more readily than indi-
vidual consumers.  See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2004).  It is a common theme in the 
international intellectual property arena that domestic producers of knowledge goods have 
“captured” the trade negotiators.  See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall, The Global Nature of Intellec-
tual Property: Discussion (2001), http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall/papers/BHH01_ 
Toronto_Maskusdiscussion.pdf; Jean O. Lanjouw & Iain M. Cockburn, New Pills for Poor 
People? Empirical Evidence After GATT, 29 WORLD DEV. 265 (2001); GREGORY C. 
SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION 156, 
159 (2003) (commenting on the study of the way that businesses influence decisions about 
which cases to bring before the WTO). 
 37. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE 
AND PUBLIC CHOICE:  TWO CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE STATE (1999). 
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tax system must make the distributive choice of how to apportion the finan-
cial burden among various classes of taxpayers.  Similarly, almost no ma-
ture intellectual property system is set up on the premise that the protection 
of intellectual property (or the reward for innovation) should be unlimited, 
and every system must determine how to spread the financial burden of the 
system among potential beneficiaries of the system. 
B.  International Policymaking 
This search for an appropriate and balanced intellectual property poli-
cy has important implications when we move from the domestic to the in-
ternational front.  My claim is that bargaining by nation-states over interna-
tional intellectual property cannot achieve the balance that any intellectual 
property system requires.  Support for this claim comes from highlighting 
the ways in which the three relevant variables—incentives, access, and the 
distribution of burdens—get distorted when we make international intellec-
tual property laws across borders.38  Consider several characteristics of poli-
cymaking in the international system that makes it difficult to reach bal-
anced outcomes. 
1.  Nation-States Seek Wealth, Not Balance 
In the international arena, countries do not seek balance; they seek to 
advance their national welfare, usually in the form of wealth.39  To an inter-
national negotiator, what matters is the impact of a proposed regime on the 
negotiator’s country; negotiators from knowledge producing countries seek 
to maximize the return to their country’s knowledge goods.40  The negotia-
tor values national income from intellectual property, and has no concern 
  
 38. It is relevant to distinguish the analysis here from two other claims about the 
inadequate process for making international intellectual property policy.  First, if the domes-
tic intellectual property policy in major knowledge-producing countries is overly protection-
ist, then the exportation of that policy to other countries will result in a global system that is 
out of balance.  This is one of the potent criticisms of the international system in Maskus & 
Reichman, supra note 15 at 295-99.  The analysis here does not depend on showing that the 
intellectual property system of any country is unbalanced.  Even if each national system has 
struck the appropriate balance, my claim is that negotiations over the expansion of those 
systems could not achieve balance.  Second, and similarly, my analysis does not depend on 
showing that domestic producers have captured the domestic machinery for making either 
national or international intellectual property policy.  Even if all relevant policymakers act in 
the national interest, the resulting international policy will be unbalanced.   
 39. See generally HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 12, at 56-57. 
 40. Scotchmer, Political Economy, supra note 24, at 416; Maskus & Reichman, 
supra note 15, at 282-83, 287.  
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for the effects of any policy on foreign consumers.41  Therefore, the goal is 
to capture profit abroad while minimizing payments of domestic consumers 
to foreign innovators.  By contrast, negotiators from knowledge importing 
countries want to minimize payments for intellectual property and have no 
regard for the interests of foreign producers of knowledge goods.42   
This tension embodies one of the profound effects of the international-
ization of intellectual property.  Knowledge producers have always empha-
sized their need for increased wealth in order to invest in new innovation.43  
In domestic circles, policymakers have always understood that this need 
must be balanced against the needs of consumers of knowledge goods.44  
With the internationalization of intellectual property, however, the produc-
er’s search for increased wealth is supported by nation-states.45  What is 
good for Microsoft is now good for the United States, for more income from 
abroad is unambiguously good for United States’ consumers.46  As a result, 
the rhetoric by which we understand intellectual property has changed; the 
production of wealth is now often thought to equate with new investment, 
which gives intellectual property discourse a new emphasis on wealth rather 
than incentive.  Rather than wealth being a means to an end (that is, to pro-
ductive innovation), it is an end in itself.47  
  
 41. See Scotchmer, Political Economy, supra note 24, at 416; Maskus & Reichman, 
supra note 15, at 282-83, 287. 
 42. The text refers to treaty-making through negotiations.  Similarly, when countries 
seek to make new international law by seeking an interpretation through the WTO’s dispute 
resolution system, the decision of whether to bring a case, and what points to argue, will also 
reflect the wealth that can be generated by securing a particular interpretation.  Of course, 
that tendency can be tempered if the WTO panels and the Appellate Body interpret TRIPS in 
favor of access and against the creation of wealth.  See generally Robert Howse, The Cana-
dian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times, 3 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 493 (2000) (criticizing the decision in Canada – Patent Protection for Phar-
maceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, March 17, 2000) (citation omitted), which invalidated a 
portion of Canadian law that increased access to generic medicines); see also Maskus & 
Reichman, supra note 15, at 308 (suggesting that Article XX of GATT could be interpreted 
as a general exception to TRIPS, allowing states to protect their reserved welfare powers).  
 43. See, e.g., SELL, supra note 11; RYAN, supra note 11, at 153-56.   
 44. It is inherent that intellectual property rights are limited in time and scope.   
 45. See SELL, supra note 11; RYAN, supra note 11, at 153-56. 
 46. Professors Maskus and Reichman refer to a possible “knowledge cartel” in the 
combination between private knowledge producers and their governments.  See Maskus & 
Reichman, supra note 15, at 295.  It should be noted, however, that such a cartel does not 
depend on traditional public choice theories. The public interest might be identical with the 
private interest and therefore could be chosen even if the relevant government policymaker is 
not influenced by the need to get private contributions or electoral support.  Because intellec-
tual property generates national wealth from foreign consumers, the interests of the people 
and the interests of a country’s knowledge producers might well coincide. 
 47. One can also see this tendency in connection with the use of the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system as well.  Nation-states bring cases in order to protect the wealth interests of 
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2.  International Lawmaking is by Negotiation, Not Interest Brokering 
The parochial interests that countries bring to international lawmaking 
are not unlike the parochial interests that producers and consumers of 
knowledge goods bring to national lawmaking.  Producers highlight the 
need for more incentives; consumers, the need for more access.  According-
ly, it is common to model international lawmaking as a struggle between 
countries that produce knowledge goods and countries that consume 
knowledge goods.  There is, however, another important difference between 
national and international lawmaking.   
In domestic systems, the policymaker is not an advocate but a broker, 
weighing the interests of consumers and producers to find an appropriate 
balance.  Admittedly, the policymaker’s decision will be influenced by the 
political strength of consumers and producers and by the policymaker’s own 
views and interests.  But the policymaker is nonetheless an independent 
broker with substantial freedom to make decisions that the policymaker 
believes provide an appropriate balance.  By contrast, in international nego-
tiations, no broker makes the law.  The policymakers and the interested par-
ties are one in the same, and each policymaker has an incentive to advocate 
positions that are manifestly parochial and self-interested. 
Theoretically, this system of making international policy by direct ne-
gotiations between self-interested countries could result in policymaking 
that reflects appropriate efficiency concerns.  Unfortunately, the circum-
stances under which that might happen are extremely unlikely to occur.  
Consumers would require perfect information about the circumstances un-
der which their interests coincided with producer interests, and bargaining 
power would have to be distributed in a way that kept the producers’ inter-
ests from overreaching. 
The most likely result when decisions are made without an independ-
ent broker/policymaker, even from an efficiency standpoint, is either under-
protection or over-protection of property, depending on whether knowledge 
producers or knowledge consumers have greater bargaining power.48  And 
the result is likely to be different for different knowledge goods.  On the one 
  
their knowledge producers, where national wealth, not a balanced adjustment of the interests 
of consumers and producers is the goal. 
 48. The literature tends to move in two directions.  On the one hand, many observers 
feel that developing countries did not make a good deal through TRIPS.  See, e.g., Eyal Ben-
venisti & George W. Downs, Distributive Politics and International Institutions: The Case of 
Drugs, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 21 (2004); Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and 
International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 779-80 
(2002).  On the other hand, intellectual property owners often point to leakages in their right 
when developing countries fail to enforce IP laws as evidence that IP owners got less than 
they bargained for.  See generally ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1990). 
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hand, knowledge consumers could so dominate the negotiations, and so 
misunderstand their own interest, that the system would yield too few incen-
tives for innovation, and the world would suffer.  On the other hand, 
knowledge producers might dominate the negotiations in ways that resulted 
in the overprotection of knowledge goods that extract more consumer pay-
ments then an efficient system of innovation would require.   It is impossi-
ble to say, a priori, which result might occur, and it is possible that the sys-
tem might over protect some knowledge goods and under protect other 
knowledge goods.  What we want to recognize at this point is that because 
international law is based only on negotiations between interested parties, 
the search for balance before an independent policymaker is not a part of the 
institutional framework. 
3.  International Systems Do Not Deal Well with Distributive Issues 
Moreover, even in the unlikely circumstance that an appropriate effi-
ciency balance might be reached through negotiations, the distributive is-
sue—the determination of which consumers in which countries should bear 
the burden of providing the incentive—is simply not one that can be made 
in negotiations between countries.  By their nature, distributive issues de-
pend on value decisions that cannot reflect self-interest (at least not if self-
interest is narrowly and proximately defined).  Distributive decisions must 
reflect either enlightened (long-term) self-interest or a measure of altru-
ism—that is, “other interest.”49  Those interests are extremely difficult to 
reflect in direct negotiations that, by their nature, are designed to aggregate 
narrow self-interest.  This is especially true when the issue is which con-
sumers should bear what share of the burden of intellectual property protec-
tion.  Under any reckoning of distributive justice, some wealthy consumers 
in poor countries ought to be treated the same as wealthy consumers in rich 
countries,50  and that is a difficult distributive goal to achieve when a coun-
try is negotiating on behalf of consumers who are both rich and poor. 
Whereas an efficient outcome can sometimes be achieved with only 
minimal institutional framework (the history of the General Agreement on 
  
 49. This is the purpose of the Rawls’ theory of justice, which would put people 
behind a “veil of ignorance”—so that they do not know their particular situation and narrow 
self-interest—and to ask them what procedures and outcomes they would then value.  See 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971).  
 50. Much of the literature on developing countries fails to recognize that even poor 
countries have rich members.  The presence of rich people among poverty explains why 
some countries can grow and yet not eliminate poverty.  The rich may get richer (allowing 
the country to grow) even if the wealth does not trickle down effectively.  Indeed, it can be 
argued that poor countries remain poor precisely because their resources are poorly distribut-
ed; the correlation between poorly distributed resources and lack of growth seems to be high 
and several causal explanations can explain the correlations.   
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Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) pre-
decessor, provides ample proof of that),51 distributive outcomes clearly can-
not be achieved without an institution that can find the common interest that 
transcends the parochial interests.52  That is why countries set up legislatures 
to make distributive decisions.  Legislatures can reflect the kind of basic 
values and shared goals that allow distributive policies to be enacted and 
sustained.53 
The different institutional mechanisms for achieving efficient and dis-
tributive results have several implications for international intellectual prop-
erty.  In implementing national policy, we often create one set of institutions 
to achieve efficiency goals and another set of institutions to achieve distrib-
utive goals.  For example, as already noted, we have a patent system for 
efficient allocation of investment incentives and a system of social safety 
nets to make access to knowledge goods available to the poor.  Indeed, one 
hallmark of contemporary public policy in the domestic arena is the way we 
segregate the domain of efficiency goals from the domain of distributive 
goals.  Thus, efficiency goals have come to fully dominate antitrust law,54 
while distributive goals that might have been incorporated into antitrust law 
have been relegated to policies of direct subsidization.55  This strategy yields 
certain advantages institutionally and allows each nation to choose the mix 
of efficiency and distributive values that matches its preferences and situa-
tion. 
  
 51. Generally, freely made exchange agreements enhance efficiency and require 
public institutional support only to enforce agreements and ensure that the exchanges were, 
in fact, freely made.   
 52. See generally Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformations: The WTO as a Distribu-
tive Organization, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1045 (2001-02).  Efficiency goals can generally 
be achieved through exchange; each party is made better off by an exchange and each party 
therefore has an incentive to move toward an efficient outcome through exchange.  The only 
institutional framework that is needed to make exchanges work is one that will preserve the 
benefits of the bargain between the parties and check opportunistic strategies by one of the 
parties.  Because distributive decisions make some people better off while others are made 
worse off, the institutional framework for distributive decisions requires greater sophistica-
tion in order to find ways of overcoming the objections of those who feel that the distribution 
decisions make leave them in a worse position.   
 53. Of course, the executive branch can also make distributive decisions, but given 
the ease of capturing the executive branch, distributive decisions made by executives alone 
often result in an increase, not a decrease, in the maldistribution of resources. 
 54. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, “Minimal” Standards for the Patent-Related Antitrust 
Law Under TRIPS, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 774 (Keith Maskus & J.H. Reich-
man eds., 2005); Eleanor M. Fox, Can Antitrust Policy Protect the Global Commons from the 
Excesses of IPRs?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER 
A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 758, 768 (Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman 
eds., 2005). 
 55. See Janis, supra note 54; Fox, supra note 54. 
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In the international realm, however, we face a different reality.  Alt-
hough we have developed strong international institutions for creating 
wealth, we have no sound institutional mechanism for determining how that 
wealth should be distributed.56  Reaching distributive goals requires a strong 
sense of shared community values or a belief that distributive goals are im-
portant components of efficiency goals.  Thus far, no real community of 
nations has developed, in part because the nation-state stands in its way and 
in part because international negotiations define success in parochial, rather 
than communitarian, terms.  Moreover, the link between distributive goals 
and individual or national welfare is blurred by the prevailing ideology that 
a rising tide lifts all boats and by some uncertainty about how to make redis-
tributive policies work.57 
As a result, although institutions like the WTO and World Intellectual 
Property Association (WIPO) promote an efficient system of global trade 
and investment, we have found no way to tax those who benefit from the 
efficiency of the global system in order to support those who do not.58  The 
World Bank, the United Nations, and other organizations perform helpful 
functions in redistributing debt capital and channeling voluntary support, 
but they have not developed mechanisms of redistribution on the scale that 
is used by national governments. 
To see the relevance of this for international intellectual property, just 
compare the distributive mechanisms that are available within a country to 
support distributive values59 with those available across countries.   Within 
countries, but not across countries, social safety nets support the distributive 
goals of any intellectual property system.  Within countries, but not across 
countries, legislators can easily substitute a subsidy system for the property 
  
 56. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, Legal Aspects of a Poverty Agenda at the 
WTO: Trade Law and ‘Global Apartheid’, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3 (2003). 
 57. See, e.g., WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS’ 
ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS (2001).  For many, of course, redistribu-
tion policy plays no role in international economic matters.  For example, the so-called 
Washington Consensus—that mix of policy advice that provides the outline of policy pre-
scriptions for developing countries—is heavily weighted toward efficiency concerns, with 
scant attention paid to distributive issues, either within countries or between countries.  See 
generally John Williamson & Stephan Haggard, The Political Conditions of Economic Re-
form, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POLICY REFORM 527 (John Williamson ed., 1994).  
Similarly, the prevailing globalization ideology that growth will come to countries that fol-
low liberal economic policies leaves little room for redistributive policies. For work that 
appreciates the importance of distributive values, see DANI RODRIK, THE NEW GLOBAL 
ECONOMY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAKING OPENNESS WORK (1999).  
 58. In the antitrust example given in the text, policymakers can achieve maximum 
efficiency for their economies by correctly enforcing antitrust laws and can then alleviate the 
burdens of a changing economy through worker retraining, unemployment insurance, and job 
placement.  
 59. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34. 
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system.  Within countries, but not across countries, price discrimination can 
be used to meet distributive goals.   Finally, although TRIPS provides tran-
sitional and access rights that can be characterized as distributive, the access 
rights are based on Western models. 
A significant challenge that exists with regard to the provision of 
global public goods like intellectual property, therefore, is to determine 
whether a system that promotes efficiency values but not distributive values 
is sustainable, and we must consider whether long-term welfare might be 
improved if we could achieve a better mix of efficiency values and distribu-
tive values.60  The issue of affordable medicine and global health policy 
elucidates the question, even if it does not show us a clear answer.61  Pro-
posals for a Global Fund for Medicines62 and for mandatory transfer of 
technology to poor countries are but two ways of embodying the redistribu-
tive ideal by making sure that the international intellectual property system 
accommodates those who cannot afford access to those knowledge goods 
that are the foundation for human welfare.63  Yet the institutional mecha-
  
 60. Robert O. Keohane made a similar point from the perspective of a political 
scientist, emphasizing that distributive issues in intellectual property are difficult to address 
internationally because international institutions are weak and power is distributed asymmet-
rically.  See Robert O. Keohane, Comment: Norms, Institutions, and Cooperation, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 65 (Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds., 2005). 
 61. Almost as soon as TRIPS was signed, the AIDS crises focused attention on the 
fact that the payments for patented medicines that TRIPS would require would hamper the 
ability of countries to address the health needs of the patients.  The international community 
responded in ways that effectively expanded the room that countries have to use the flexibili-
ties of TRIPS to meet the health needs of their people.   See generally Frederick M. Abbott, 
The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public 
Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317 (2005); Frederick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The Her-
culean Task of Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS 
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 393 
(Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds., 2005); Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse, Theory 
and Implementation of Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REGIME 425 (Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds., 2005). 
 62. See The Global Fund Summary Report: An International Meeting to Support the 
Global Fund (2003), http://www.theglobalfund.org/pdf/paris/summaryreporten.pdf. 
 63. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology 
Transfer to Developing Countries?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 227 (Keith Maskus & 
J.H. Reichman eds., 2005); Pedro Roffe, Comment: Technology Transfer on the International 
Agenda, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A 
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 257 (Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds., 
2005); Keith E. Maskus et al., Patent Rights and International Technology Transfer Through 
Direct Investment and Licensing, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 265 (Keith Maskus & 
J.H. Reichman eds., 2005). 
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nisms for integrating these distributive values into the international system 
are rudimentary at best.64 
4.  Positive Externalities are Not Necessarily Disincentives to Invest-
ment 
As indicated earlier, designing an intellectual property system is es-
sentially the task of dealing with positive externalities (spillovers).  Because 
knowledge can so easily be appropriated, the benefits generated by new 
knowledge must sometimes be internalized so that those who produce the 
benefits can be rewarded for their work.  This is what intellectual property 
does.  By creating property rights and giving the property owner the oppor-
tunity to charge a price that measures the benefit of the new knowledge to 
users, intellectual property effectively internalizes enough of the benefits of 
new knowledge to compensate the entity that developed the new 
knowledge.  Finding the proper balance between incentive and access is 
essentially the task of determining what proportion of the external benefits 
  
 64. The difficulty of incorporating distributive values in the international system is 
illustrated by the fact that transborder market mechanisms do not produce the kind of price 
discrimination that one would expect in a world where some countries are very poor and 
others are very wealthy.  In a world where consumers have disparate incomes, it would be 
rational for a seller of knowledge goods to try to maximize returns by selling at low prices in 
poorer countries and at higher prices in wealthier countries (provided that the seller can keep 
arbitrage from disrupting the scheme).  By having prices reflect disparate abilities to pay, 
markets often induce sellers to engage in the kind of price discrimination that increases ac-
cess to products for low income consumers.  When that occurs, prices reflect ability to pay 
and thus respond to the preexisting distribution of wealth.  Yet studies have shown that in 
significant market segments, sellers of knowledge goods are not significantly lowering their 
prices to reflect the poverty of a country, choosing instead to sell fewer units to the (relative-
ly few) customers who can afford to pay more for the product.  See Catalin Cosovanu, Pira-
cy, Price Discrimination, and Development: The Software Sector in Eastern Europe and 
Other Emerging Markets, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 13-18 (2003); F.M. Scherer & 
Jayashree Watal, Post-Trips Options for Access to Patented Medicines for Developing Coun-
tries 45-46 (Comm’n on Macroeconomics & Health Working Paper No. WG4:1, 2001), 
available at http://www.cmhealth.org/docs/wg4_paper1.pdf (presenting evidence concerning 
patented medicines); Keith E. Maskus & Mattias Ganslandt, Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuti-
cal Products: Implications for Procuring Medicines for Poor Countries, in THE ECONOMICS 
OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 57 (Brigitte Granville ed., 2003).  Producers may keep prices of IP 
products high because they are afraid that low priced units will be transshipped to other 
countries where prices are higher (thus eroding the revenue from rich countries) because 
even low prices are beyond the reach of most consumers, or because they hope that govern-
ments will increase investments to suppress piracy, thereby inducing even poor consumers to 
pay more for the product.  See Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: 
Some Economic Considerations, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 563, 566-67 (2001-02) (analyzing rea-
sons for lack of price discrimination on essential patented medicines).  For any of these rea-
sons, the market is often not facilitating the kind of discrimination that would increase access 
to knowledge goods. 
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from the investment should be internalized and what proportion of the bene-
fits need not be internalized. 
Yet, the appropriate policy framework for addressing external benefits 
is exceedingly complex.  Not all external benefits need to be internalized for 
efficient investment to take place.65  Quite the contrary, external benefits 
that are not required to induce the activity that gives rise to the benefit are 
normally as free as the air, an unintended but welcome byproduct of the 
activity that gave the benefits in the first place.  Free riding, a potent rhetor-
ical tool for expanding intellectual property, is in fact generally tolerated 
and encouraged by law and public policy.66  Intellectual property law is an 
exception to the general rule that external benefits ought to be in the public 
domain.67   
In this regard, some of the international intellectual property literature 
proceeds from an analytical error because it assumes, as a general proposi-
tion, that the existence of external benefits will lead to underinvestment in 
the production of knowledge goods.  Some economists, for example, believe 
that TRIPS successfully addresses the problem of external benefits because 
otherwise countries would tend to provide too little incentive because “some 
of the gains from innovation accrue to consumers and users in other coun-
tries, a benefit that framers of [intellectual property rights] would not take 
into account in setting domestic standards.”68  Statements such as this ex-
press the notion that external benefits must be internalized through the intel-
  
 65. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Rid-
ing, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005); see also Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 
40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 624-25 (2003); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23. 
 66. Professor Lemley notes that: 
Positive externalities are everywhere.  We couldn’t internalize them all even if we 
wanted to.  Areeda and Hovenkamp offer numerous examples of uncompensated 
positive externalities.  They conclude that ‘free riding on the positive externalities 
created by others is everywhere, and society does little to eliminate it.’  And as 
noted above, there is no reason we should particularly want to do so.  If ‘free rid-
ing’ means merely obtaining a benefit from another’s investment, the law does not, 
cannot, and should not prohibit it.  If the marginal social cost of benefiting from a 
use is zero, prohibiting that use imposes unnecessary social costs.  
Lemley, supra note 65, at 1049 (internal citations omitted). 
 67. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (identifying 
a privilege to compete when copied elements are not protected by intellectual property law); 
Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting privilege to use another’s name 
in a descriptive sense to compete); Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946 (Minn. 1909) (endorsing 
the privilege to take another’s customers by competition). 
 68. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 15, at 285.  See, e.g., Phillip McCalman, Na-
tional Patents, Innovation, and International Agreements, 11 J. INT’L TRADE & ECON. DEV.  
1, 4 (2002); Scotchmer, Political Economy, supra note 24, at 417.  The desire to capture these 
external benefits was, of course, an important part of the argument by the United States for 
the geographic expansion of intellectual property.  See generally U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT ON 
U.S.  INDUSTRY AND TRADE (1988).  
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lectual property system in order to get the right amount of investment in 
innovation.  
As a general matter, this view is erroneous.69  One cannot deny, of 
course, that an innovator’s difficulty in capturing the benefit of an invention 
may discourage investment.  A country with a small market is unlikely to be 
able to support innovation for that market unless it can also capture the ben-
efits that occur in other markets by internalizing them.70  And we know that 
investment in cures for certain diseases is systematically deficient when the 
market for those cures is too small to support research.71  These are both 
instances in which it is accurate to claim that external benefits must be cap-
tured.  But this does not mean that all external benefits must be internalized 
if appropriate incentives are to be given, or that the existence of external 
benefits necessarily discourages investment.   
In this respect, external benefits must be distinguished from external 
costs.  Costs make people worse off, and therefore must be allocated so that 
they can be minimized; benefits, however, make people better off, so there 
is no reason, at least in principle, why they need to be reduced or rationed.72  
When a driver hits a pedestrian, we cannot avoid asking whether the loss 
should be borne by the driver or the pedestrian, which is the same as asking 
whether the cost should be internalized to the activity of driving or to the 
activity of walking.73  But when a person plants a flower garden in front of 
her home and the benefit she receives outweighs the cost of the planting, 
there is no reason to ask whether others who enjoy the beauty of the flower 
garden should pay for it.74  The enjoyment by others is not something that 
  
 69. The important point often missed in the discussion of external benefits, and one 
particularly missing from the discussion of international intellectual property, is that the 
value of the benefits that are conferred on others is an independent source of demand for the 
product; it should not be treated as a part of cumulative demand.  If the demand that repre-
sents how much people would pay for the external benefits is less than the demand that the 
seller faces, the seller will provide the external benefits simply by meeting the demand of 
those who are willing to pay the seller for the non-excludable benefits.   
 70. See Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the 
Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47 (2002). 
 71. Id.  
 72. See Lemley, supra note 65. 
 73. In other words, when losses occur we cannot avoid deciding whether the losses 
should lay where they fall or whether they should be allocated to another person.  That is the 
function of tort law.  The losses are an externality that must be allocated to either driving or 
to the injured pedestrian.  In general, if the defendant is negligent the losses are allocated to 
the defendant (they become an externality of driving) if not, the losses remain with the victim 
(and are therefore internalized to the act of walking).  See, e.g., Hammontree v. Jenner, 97  
Cal. Rptr. 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (holding victim of driver who had a seizure must bear the 
loss and cannot seek compensation). 
 74. This is true whether the benefit to the homeowner is derived from the homeown-
er’s personal satisfaction, from the reputation value of being well-thought-of, or from the 
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must be rationed, and the fact that others enjoy the garden is not an external-
ity of the garden that needs to be considered when assessing incentives to 
plant flowers.   
In other words, a person’s incentive to invest in an activity whose 
benefits can be appropriated by others is not necessarily deterred from en-
gaging in profitable investment just because benefits are bestowed on oth-
ers.75  This is true even if the person doing the appropriation is a potential 
competitor of the person doing the investing.76  Consider the flower farmer 
who can increase his yield by investing in bees to pollinate his flowers.  He 
knows that his neighbor, also a flower farmer, may benefit from his invest-
ment if bees stray into the neighbor’s flower fields.  What factors does the 
farmer consider when deciding whether to invest in more bees and what 
influence does the external benefits have on his decision?  Naturally, the 
farmer considers the costs and benefits of the bees to him and will invest in 
the bees whenever the expected private benefits exceed the expected private 
costs.  He will not automatically consider the benefits to the neighbor to be 
a deterrent to making the investment, as long as his private benefits exceed 
his private costs.  To him, the benefit to others is not relevant to whether he 
makes the investment. 
Admittedly, if the benefit to the neighboring farmer allows the neigh-
bor to have a competitive advantage (because the neighbor can free ride on 
the bees), that benefit becomes a cost that the first farmer must consider.  If 
that cost is high enough, the farmer who is thinking of investing in bees may 
decline to make the investment, and as a result both farmers will be worse 
off.  But whether that occurs is an empirical issue, and even benefits that 
give a neighbor a competitive advantage will not necessarily deter the initial 
investment.77  The benefit to the neighbor may indeed become a cost to the 
first farmer, but the total cost of the investment to the first farmer may still 
be less than his total benefit.  When it is, the first farmer will make the in-
vestment.  Businesses make investments all the time that they know will 
benefit their competitors, and businesses are not necessarily deterred from 
making the investment simply because their investment bestows benefits on 
others.78   
  
homeowner’s knowledge that others will enjoy the garden (that is, from the pleasure of giv-
ing pleasure to others).   
 75. See Lemley, supra note 65. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. 
 78. We need look no further than intellectual property law itself to see this.  Invest-
ment in innovation is made even when the investor knows that after the period of protection 
the investor will not capture the external benefits of the investment, and even knowing that 
exceptions to the property rights may allow some users to capture the external benefits of the 
knowledge.  Outside of intellectual property law, of course, the general rule is that competi-
tive imitation is privileged, and yet firms make investments knowing that the benefits of the 
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The factors that influence the public policy toward external benefits 
have important implications for our discussion of international intellectual 
property law.  Under this analysis, countries with large markets are not nec-
essarily deterred from increasing investment in innovation just because the 
innovation will benefit people in other countries.  For example, knowledge 
producers in a country like the United States are not deterred from investing 
in remedies for high cholesterol or impotence just because the research may 
benefit people in other countries who do not have to pay for the investment.  
The United States market is large enough so that the benefits to the United 
States citizens who must pay for those knowledge goods can fully compen-
sate those who invest in producing the knowledge goods.  That incentive for 
investment is not diminished by the fact that consumers in countries without 
patent systems can free ride on that investment. 
It is therefore a mistake to suggest that external benefits will neces-
sarily deter investment, or that external benefits will deter the countries of 
the world from reaching optimum incentives for investment in knowledge 
goods.79  In a number of instances, the appropriate incentives will emerge 
simply because countries determine that the private (domestic) benefits of 
such investment outweigh the private (domestic) costs.80  Some extraterrito-
rial incentive to invest may be required when markets are not large enough 
to support optimal investment,81 but one must remember that over-
investment can be as inefficient as under investment.   
The same point can be made another way—by inverting the normal in-
tellectual property paradigm.  The conventional paradigm stresses those 
instances in which external benefits must be internalized to enhance effi-
cient markets, but the paradigm can easily be restated in terms of what 
should not be protected.  Because many external benefits are benign and do 
not deter efficient investment, one can view the goal of any intellectual 
property system to be to maximize the external benefits of innovation, con-
sistent with generating enough reward for the producers of knowledge 
goods to stimulate investment that would not otherwise take place.  As a 
  
investment will be shared with competitors.  A firm may lower its prices to see whether sales 
go up; if sales go up, competitors imitate the behavior and reap some of the benefit of the 
investment the firm made in lower prices.  See generally Reichman, supra note 34.   
 79. See Lemley, supra note 65. 
 80. This is especially true given the huge markets that are bound together by harmo-
nized intellectual property law in North America, Europe, and Japan—a harmonization that 
evolved relatively naturally.   
 81. This is the general but narrow point made in Sykes, supra note 70.  Moreover, 
one prominent group of experts concluded that because markets in poor countries are unlike-
ly to support research and development costs even if a property rights solution were availa-
ble, the only effective way of insuring investment in orphan drugs is through public support 
for relevant research.   See CIPR Report, supra note 10, at 29-52. 
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society, we should celebrate the generation of external benefits and not den-
igrate them, for external benefits mean increased consumer welfare. 
5.  The Exchange Model Does Not Work for International Intellectual 
Property 
Thus far, I have made four general points: (1) in international negotia-
tions each nation seeks to maximize its own wealth or welfare, (2) interna-
tional policymaking is done without an external decision-maker, (3) distrib-
utive issues are ignored in international negotiations, and (4) large countries 
are not deterred from adopting efficient investment policies just because 
people in other countries benefit from the investment.  In light of those fac-
tors, negotiations over intellectual property using the traditional forums of 
the WTO cannot achieve the right balance between producer incentives and 
consumer benefits. 
The WTO makes international policy through reciprocal exchanges 
between countries.82  One country gives up a policy (say high tariffs) that is 
detrimental to a second country, and the second country gives up a policy 
(its high tariffs) that is detrimental to the first country.  This exchange mod-
el works reasonably well when dealing with tariff and non-tariff barriers.  
Through the exchange, inefficient policies are bargained away and both 
countries are, for that reason, made better off.  Global efficiency is in-
creased, which is a benefit to everyone. 
However, this exchange model is ill-suited for the task of making in-
ternational intellectual property policy.83  One reason that the WTO ex-
change is a poor mechanism for making global policy for knowledge goods 
is that bargaining power at the WTO is unevenly distributed.84  Countries 
with large markets have more to offer than countries with small markets and 
therefore can exact better terms in any exchange.85  Countries with such 
power also have the ability to break up countervailing coalitions of small 
countries by using bilateral and regional agreements to leverage their pow-
  
 82. See generally Peter M. Gerhart, The Two Constitutional Visions of the World 
Trade Organization, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 12-17 (2003) (describing WTO functions). 
 83. Professors Maskus and Reichman have noted the irony of incorporating a system 
regulating property rights within a system that is designed to free global trade from govern-
ment restrictions.  See Maskus and Reichman, supra note 15, at 292.  Although a well-
designed intellectual property system is consistent with a well-designed market system (be-
cause both are designed to enhance efficient resource allocation), the institutional mecha-
nisms by which competition is promoted are not necessarily appropriate mechanisms for 
determining when competition should be curtailed. 
 84. See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 15, at 294 (referring to both the knowledge 
gap and the power gap between developed and developing countries). 
 85. See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power?  Consensus-Based 
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 55 INT’L ORG. 339, 341-47 (2002). 
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er.86  They can use preferential access to leverage their power.87  They can 
use the promise of reciprocal treatment to leverage their power.88  This al-
lows large countries to hold on to their bargaining power longer than would 
otherwise be possible.  When bargaining over new forms of wealth is influ-
enced by the existing wealth of a country, the exchange model may merely 
perpetuate wealth disparities.89 
I do not rest my case only on the problem of disparate bargaining 
power, though.  My argument is that even if bargaining power were more 
evenly distributed, the exchange model is not appropriate for intellectual 
property policymaking. 
As we have seen, in any negotiation over intellectual property, each 
country is negotiating to increase its own wealth from knowledge goods.90  
In this respect, negotiations over intellectual property give the appearance of 
being just like negotiations over tariff and non-tariff barriers, though they 
are quite different.  In tariff negotiations, each country is made better off by 
the exchange because its export opportunities increase and its consumers 
  
 86. See Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO 
System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79 (2004); Peter Drahos, Secur-
ing the Future of Intellectual Property: Intellectual Property Owners and Their Nodally 
Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 53 (2004); Peter Drahos, 
Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting, 5 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 765 (2002); Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPS: Bilateralism in Intellectual Proper-
ty, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001); Keith E. Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights in Lebanon, in CATCHING UP WITH THE COMPETITION: TRADE OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES FOR ARAB COUNTRIES 251 (Bernard Hoekman & Jamel Zarrouk eds., 2000); 
Okediji, supra note 13, at 125; DAVID VIVAS-EUGUI, QUAKER UNITED NATIONS OFFICE, 
REGIONAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE FREE TRADE AREA 
OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA) 3 (2003), available at  http://www.quno.org/gen- 
eva/pdf/economic/Issues/FTAs-TRIPS-plus-English.pdf. 
 87. Peter M. Gerhart & Archana Seema Kella, Power and Preferences: Developing 
Countries and the Role of the WTO Appellate Body, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 515 
(2005). 
 88. Non-reciprocal provisions extend intellectual property protection to citizens of 
other countries whether or not those countries give reciprocal treatment to the first country.  
Reciprocal provisions extend national treatment obligations only to citizens of countries that 
give citizens of the first country reciprocal rights.  Powerful countries can therefore use the 
promise of national treatment, and the denial of national treatment status, to induce other 
countries to grant its citizens rights in order to earn the reciprocal rights from the powerful 
country for their citizens.  The use of reciprocal leverage in intellectual property is reviewed 
in Yu, supra note 4, at 375-81. 
 89. See PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRATHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS 
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002); Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialis-
tic, Outdated, and Overprotective, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MORAL, LEGAL, AND 
INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS 243 (Adam D. Moore ed., 1997).  The notion that negotiations 
may perpetuate wealth disparities is at odds with the dominant picture of the WTO as an 
organization built on principles of reciprocity, mutual benefit, and the rule of law.  See, e.g., 
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109-11 (2d ed. 1997). 
 90. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47. 
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benefit from lower import prices.  The negotiation is therefore a positive 
sum game with net winners on both sides.  In intellectual property negotia-
tions, however, an increase in one country’s wealth from knowledge goods 
is a decrease in another country’s wealth from knowledge goods.  This is 
because once the knowledge is produced and encapsulated as property, it 
must be rationed through the market system.91 This marketing, in turn, 
makes the decision to create property rights a zero sum game.92  Producers 
of knowledge goods win, while consumers of knowledge goods lose. 
In other words, the purpose of intellectual property negotiations is to 
determine how much of the knowledge already generated in the world 
should be encapsulated in a property regime.  That decision is necessarily a 
decision to shift wealth from consumers to producers without necessarily 
creating any new knowledge (for the knowledge has already been created), 
and the negotiation is necessarily over how to split a fixed pie rather than 
negotiations over how to make the pie bigger.   
Admittedly, if the decision to shift wealth from consumer to producer 
increases the level of innovation in an efficient direction, then the negotia-
tion is not over a zero sum output, and the negotiation would increase global 
welfare.  But that is not what negotiators are trying to achieve: when the 
United States goes to the negotiations, it is seeking to increase the wealth 
from its portfolio of knowledge goods, not to increase the portfolio of its 
knowledge goods.  It simply wants to capture a larger share of the benefits 
its innovations create as a goal in itself rather than as the means to increas-
ing investment in innovation.  The goal is to induce other countries to pay 
more for knowledge already generated rather than to pay for investment in 
new knowledge. 
To see this, consider the following thought exercise: when the United 
States, with its large market, adopts an intellectual property regime that it 
thinks will induce an efficient level of domestic investment, a level that 
matches the benefit of additional investment against the higher prices gen-
erated by intellectual property protection.  It sets that policy without regard 
to external benefits to other countries, for as has been shown, in the great 
majority of cases those benefits are irrelevant to decisions about domestic 
policy.  What it tries to achieve through international negotiations is to in-
crease the returns to its knowledge goods by convincing other countries to 
  
 91. See Scotchmer, Political Economy, supra note 24, at 426-35. 
 92. The market system generally yields positive sum results because the exchange of 
money for goods (or even goods for goods) makes both parties better off.  Because the in-
formation that is encapsulated in property would otherwise be free, market transactions in 
intellectual property make one person pay for something that would otherwise be available 
for nothing.  See Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 129 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 
2000). 
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pay for them (by adopting intellectual property systems).  That strategy 
makes perfect sense from a domestic standpoint, for the increased revenue 
is a benefit to the United States even if it does not lead to an increase in 
investment in new knowledge goods.  It occurs because, as we have said, 
when the United States is acting in the international arena, it is trying to 
maximize its wealth, not find the right balance between incentive and ac-
cess.   
The mistake is to assume that because the United States has increasing 
revenue from knowledge goods it will have an efficient increase in invest-
ment in new knowledge goods.  This is to confuse necessity with sufficien-
cy.  It is, of course, necessary to provide a stream of income to knowledge 
producers in order to induce them to invest in new knowledge.  But provid-
ing a stream of income does not guarantee that investments in innovation 
will be efficient.  It is not true that the more revenue one provides to 
knowledge producers the greater the level of efficient investment.  By the 
hypothesis that underlies the intellectual property model, the additional rev-
enue may lead to investment that is wasteful rather than efficient.  Were it 
otherwise, patents would be of unlimited duration and geographic scope.  
The fact that the intellectual property paradigm is one of limited property 
rights shows that throwing money at the problem of knowledge creation is 
not sufficient for efficient knowledge creation.93  Access to knowledge and 
competition over knowledge goods also matter. 
To put the matter another way, as the geographic (or any other) di-
mension of intellectual property protection grows, some other dimension of 
intellectual property protection should shrink in order to keep the system at 
the correct balance.  The United States will erect a system for producing 
knowledge goods that is well balanced for the market that its knowledge 
producers can serve.  If the United States is then able to expand that market 
for knowledge goods by inducing other countries to protect intellectual 
property, its revenues will increase.  Given the assumptions that we have 
already made, however, those additional revenues do not induce efficient 
investment because the system was already producing sufficient revenue to 
induce an efficient level of investment (otherwise it would have been 
changed domestically).94  The additional revenue is simply a transfer from 
  
 93. Lemley, supra note 65, at 1058-65 (explaining the problems of overcompensat-
ing investment in knowledge). 
 94. Alan Deardorff has made the point that establishing intellectual property in only 
one part of the world can maximize the incentive to invest in innovation.  Alan V. Deardorff, 
Welfare Effects of Global Patent Protection, 59 ECONOMICA 35 (1992).  There is, in other 
words, a unique stream of revenue that is associated with an efficient level of investment.  
Whether that revenue comes from one group of countries or another group of countries is a 
separate choice that must be made.  There are a large variety of combinations of countries 
that could provide the appropriate revenue.  See Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L. C. Lai, 
International Protection of Intellectual Property, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1635, 1637 (2004).  
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consumers (foreign) to producers (United States).  This is a benefit to the 
United States, not to global efficiency in investment in knowledge goods. 
Contrast this scenario with what should happen when the geographic 
scope of protection (or any other dimension of intellectual property protec-
tion) increases.  An increase in the foreign revenue to United States produc-
ers of knowledge goods should allow the United States to decrease the do-
mestic revenue from the sale of knowledge goods.  The revenue from great-
er geographical protection should be offset by the decrease in revenue from 
domestic protection (perhaps by lowering the length of protection domesti-
cally, for example).  That does not happen, of course, because there is no 
institutional mechanism for matching the costs and benefits of new innova-
tion and assessing costs based on benefits.  Producers of knowledge goods 
in the United States get to keep the extra revenue for greater geographic 
protection without generating any efficient new innovation. 
All of this is to say that the design of intellectual property systems re-
quires very careful attention to distributive issues, and those distributive 
issues are difficult to address when law is made by exchanges between na-
tion-states.  Not only does the system tend to overprotect intellectual prop-
erty, but the system has no way of determining how much of the necessary 
contribution to the innovative enterprise should be paid by one group of 
consumers over another.  The “one size fits all” nature of intellectual prop-
erty, without a method of adjusting the contribution to reflect the ability to 
pay or some other basis for assigning costs, inevitably leads to too much 
protection and too little access for those who need the knowledge goods.   
II.  REALIGNING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Thus far, I have argued that the tragedy of TRIPS is the attempt to 
make global policy toward intellectual property through the interaction of 
heterogeneous nation-states using an exchange model.95  My basic argument 
is that an exchange model makes it impossible to find the balance between 
the interests of knowledge producers and knowledge users, taking into ac-
count the need to distribute the burdens and benefits of the system among 
consumers with different levels of wealth, both within and across nation-
states.  Under an exchange model, nation-states seek to improve their indi-
vidual wealth, while intellectual property policy requires an institutional 
framework that can achieve balance between the necessary incentive and 
access (that is, between private and public domain property), and accom-
plish a distribution of the burdens and benefits of the system that reflects 
appropriate distributive values. 
  
 95. See supra text accompanying notes 83-94. 
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The question remains: what institutional redesign might bring us clos-
er to the ideal?96  I am happy to offer some suggestions.  When looking for 
new institutional designs, however, we run into a dilemma.  No machinery 
exists for making international policy other than through the interaction of 
nation-states, and that interaction has already led to the institutional frame-
work that I criticize.  It will, in other words, take the community of nation-
states, the very group that supports the present institutional arrangement, to 
design better institutional arrangements, and it is not clear why they would 
be inclined to do so.  As a result, proposals designed to restore balance to 
the international intellectual property system are likely to look impractical 
or merely hortatory.  If the problems stem from the inadequacy of policy 
made by bargaining between nations, what would cause the countries that 
drive the system to recognize different incentives or give up bargaining 
power? 
I propose to address this dilemma by considering institutional design 
at two levels.  First, I propose particular institutional arrangements that 
would respond to the problems already identified, and thereby reduce the 
distortions in the current system.  Second, I propose to discuss factors that 
would induce countries to move toward the designs that are available.  The 
first discussion shows how institutional arrangements might be set up to 
address the current distortions.  The second discussion shows why nation-
states, responding to changing conditions, might find those institutional 
arrangements attractive.   
At the outset, it might be helpful to discuss, at a general level, the rela-
tionship between the existing problems, the proposed solutions, and the 
reasons why the nation-states of the world might, over time, find the solu-
tions to be palatable.  Broadly speaking, the major problems are distributive 
problems—that is, questions of who should bear the costs of inducing effi-
cient investment in innovation and problems of how we bargain for efficient 
allocations of investment when bargaining is based on national, not global, 
interests.97  Accordingly, the recommended solutions are distributive solu-
tions—namely, institutional mechanisms that take into account distributive 
values or that compensate for the ill effects of existing maldistributions of 
wealth. 
Because I am seeking distributive solutions to distributive problems, 
the practical question of implementation through the community of nation-
states resolves itself into determining whether nation-states will incorporate 
distributive values into their policymaking.  The source of current distor-
  
 96. The recent call by two of the most knowledgeable international IP scholars for a 
“moratorium on stronger international intellectual property standards” would set the frame-
work for a reconsideration of the institutional mechanisms through which we make interna-
tional intellectual property policy.  See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 15, at 312.   
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 27-34. 
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tions is that each nation-state identifies its interests separately from the in-
terests of other nation-states, without appreciating the effect of its position 
on other nation-states.  By contrast, distributive solutions assume that na-
tion-states begin to understand the ways in which their interests depend on 
advancing the interests of other nation-states, so that each nation is willing 
to look beyond its narrow self interest and sacrifice on behalf of the collec-
tive.  When they do, distributive values will begin to shape the institutional 
design of the international system.   
Of course, that does not imply that international institutions are bereft 
of any mechanism for considering distributive values.98  Instead, this merely 
shows that distributive values are neither well-entrenched nor well-specified 
in international institutions.  Before outlining some of the ways in which 
distributive values inherent in intellectual property law can be given a more 
central focus in international institutions, it might be helpful to briefly 
summarize existing mechanisms that give international law a distributive 
element.   
First, of course, foreign aid can be explicitly redistributive, especially 
when it is not tied to the narrow self-interests of the donor country.99  The 
Millennium Development Goals have been supported by contributions from 
wealthy countries that seek to increase global redistribution.100  In the intel-
lectual property arena, some of the aid that is given for capacity building— 
that is, aid that is intended to help developing countries negotiate or imple-
  
 98. I have argued that the WTO negotiations are sometimes capable of making 
distributive choices.  See Gerhart, supra note 52.  I have also argued that the Appellate Body 
is capable of taking distributive values into account.   See Gerhart & Kella, supra note 87.  
And, of course, institutions like the United Nations and international non-profit organizations 
perform distributive functions.   
 99. To the extent that donor countries condition their foreign aid on the recipient 
country agreeing to conditions that benefit the donor country, the altruistic, distributive char-
acter of the aid may be reduced.  See Gerhart & Kella, supra note 87.  It is helpful to consid-
er the impact of various conditions on the nature of the distribution that aid really confers.  
Sometimes, the conditions on which foreign aid is given are designed to ensure that the aid is 
used in the interest of the recipient country, rather than being siphoned away through corrup-
tion by the recipient country’s government.  At other times, conditions on which foreign aid 
is given benefit the donor country without hurting the recipient country.  This occurs, for 
example, when the foreign aid requires the recipient country to purchase goods from the 
donor country, a condition that may bind the recipient country but that also creates a “win-
win” situation that may make the donation possible in the first place.  To the extent that 
conditions put on foreign aid hurt the recipient country, of course, the redistributive impact 
of the aid is diminished.   
 100. See Abdel Hamid Bouab, Financing for Development, The Monterrey Consen-
sus: Achievements and Prospects, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 359 (2004) (reviewing the 2002 con-
ference on assisting developing countries, including more aid).  
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ment agreements more wisely—is a form of redistribution.101  Although one 
may be skeptical of the amount or effectiveness of such aid, its existence 
suggests that redistribution is possible. 
Second, implicit redistribution goes on through regime shifting.102  
This occurs because some international institutions, such as the World 
Health Organization or various human rights agencies, have an explicitly 
distributive agenda.  Their concern for those in need serves as an interna-
tional counterbalance to institutions like the WTO that focus more clearly 
on international efficiency.  As scholars have shown, by shifting select por-
tions of the international intellectual property agenda from WIPO and the 
WTO to the other institutions, developing countries and others interested in 
the rights of intellectual property users have successfully broadened the 
agenda for international intellectual property to include non-efficiency val-
ues.103 
Of course, redistribution of a kind occurs when developing countries 
insist that obligations they had previously undertaken be rolled back.  
When, at the start of the Doha Round, developing countries refused to nego-
tiate until developed countries had refined and broadened rights of access 
available under TRIPS, they were successful in getting at least some addi-
tional flexibility in the obligations they had previously undertaken.104  If the 
poor countries of the world could find a basis for forming coalitions to ne-
gotiate for greater access, their access to intellectual property or for the 
recognition of distributive coalitions would likely be improved.105  
Finally, transition periods that allow poor countries greater latitude in 
complying with TRIPS obligations are a form of redistributive policymak-
  
 101. The WTO capacity building programs and their funding are described at World 
Trade Organization, Doha Development Agenda, Trade Capacity Building Database, 
http://tcbdb.wto.org/ (last visited June 10, 2007). 
 102. See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dy-
namics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) 
[hereinafter Helfer, Regime Shifting] (describing redistribution through regime shifting); 
Laurence R. Helfer, Mediating Interactions in an Expanding International Intellectual Prop-
erty Regime, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 123 (2004).  See also JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER 
DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 564-71 (2000) (detailing ability of powerful states 
to leverage their power by shifting the agenda from one international forum to another).  For 
other discussions of the nature of the repeat negotiating process that leads to international 
intellectual property, see Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Proper-
ty: Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property Sys-
tem, 7 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 315 (2003); Susan Sell, Intellectual Property and Public 
Policy in Historical Perspective: Contestation and Settlement, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 267 
(2004). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Gerhart, supra note 52, at 1074-81.  
 105. See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 15, at 311 (suggesting that developing 
countries could be “defenders of the competitive ethos” by representing the interests of both 
consumers and follow-on inventors).  
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ing, since they explicitly take into account a country’s poverty in determin-
ing what share of the incentive for the production of knowledge goods the 
country must bear.106  In a similar vein, when one country implicitly or ex-
plicitly tolerates violations of TRIPS by another country, it is acquiescing to 
behavior that reduces the burden of that country to contribute to the global 
incentive for innovation.107  To the extent that this toleration is based on the 
other country’s poverty, it can be taken to be redistributive.   
The world is therefore not bereft of distributive values.  The important 
element is to capitalize on these humanitarian but largely donative instincts 
and build better international institutions for redistribution.  Let us turn first 
to possible solutions, followed by a discussion of trends that may turn those 
possible solutions into practicable ones.  
A.  The Possible Solutions 
Building on these initial moves toward formulating distributive values 
within the international policymaking system, more systemic ways of think-
ing about institutions for making intellectual property law may cast future 
proposals in a more refulgent light.  I offer thoughts about two types of so-
lutions: the first is directed at the distributive values that are important in 
achieving balance in any intellectual property system, and the second is 
directed at the problem of bargaining power that distorts the efficiency of 
the international system for intellectual property. 
1.  The Redistributive Solutions 
The keys to any distributive solution are to: (1) recognize that interna-
tional cooperation creates winners and losers; (2) identify the winners and 
losers; and then (3) find a way to shift some of the gains of cooperation 
from winners to losers.  Because the winners have to buy into this system, it 
is important that the winners be able to keep a large portion of their gains 
while also understanding that their long-term interests require some sacri-
fice of their short-term gains.  The winners are, after all, the beneficiaries of 
the system, and must recognize that as beneficiaries they have a special in-
terest in the system’s growth and prosperity.  When they recognize that their 
self-interest and their interests in systemic success are identical, sharing is 
possible.   
  
 106. See Gerhart, supra note 52, at 1076. 
 107. Id. at 1086. 
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a.  A Redistributive Tax 
The easiest option is to tax the increased wealth of those who gain 
from the international intellectual property system and then use that revenue 
to meet the distributive goals of the system.  Naturally, such a system seems 
to be particularly far-fetched.  Attention to several important features of any 
such system would not only increase acceptance of the system, but would 
also serve to address concerns that naturally arise in implementing redis-
tributive systems.  First, the system should impose a tax only on increases in 
wealth generated by the international system.  The tax, in other words, 
should be based not on the wealth of those who gain from the system, but 
instead on the increases in wealth that the system generates for them.  In 
that way, incentive distortions would be minimized, and those who gain 
from the system would recognize that their contributions to the redistribu-
tive aspects of the system would be measured by the extent to which the 
system increased their welfare. 
Second, to insure accountability, policymakers would have to careful-
ly establish the institution that would determine how the tax proceeds would 
be distributed.108  Such a redistributive tax would work best if the distribu-
tions were geared to specific goals with measurable outcomes (so that all 
institutions could be held accountable) and if the distributions could be 
steered around governments, where corruption might impose an additional 
tax on the proceeds, and directly to recipients who could put the money to 
work.109  Finally, such a system would work best if the entities that paid the 
tax might also benefit in some indirect way from the disbursements to needy 
recipients.  That would not only reduce resistance to such a system, but 
would also increase the sense of shared commitment to a common goal.  
Consistent with these guidelines, one can imagine the following kind 
of arrangement.  The international system could impose a tax on increases 
in transnational royalty payments for pharmaceuticals between developed 
countries.  This tax would be paid only on annual increases on transnational 
patent royalties, and only by companies in countries that could distribute the 
burden of the tax internally (so that poor consumers adversely affected by 
the tax could be compensated with internal transfers).  Individuals or health 
ministries in countries that could not otherwise afford the medicines would 
  
 108. The discussion here is meant to counter the frequent suggestion that distributive 
policies do not work effectively because too little of the money gets to those who need it.   
This is a frequent criticism, for example, of foreign aid.  EASTERLY, supra note 57, at 25-44.  
These criticisms are being countered by those who think that giving aid directly to people, 
and by-passing governments, can be done effectively.   See, e.g., JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END 
OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME (2005). 
 109. This is one of the attractions of micro-finance, which provides small loans to 
individuals.  See the Microfinance Gateway, Frequently Asked Questions, What is Micro-
finance?, http://www.microfinancegateway.com/section/faq#Q1 (last visited June 10, 2007). 
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then use the proceeds to subsidize the purchase of pharmaceuticals.110  Ap-
propriate protections would insure that the medicines actually got to the 
people who needed them, and the results of the plan could be measured in 
quantifiable terms relating either to the decrease in disease or the increase in 
medicine usage.  Under this plan, pharmaceutical companies would, in ef-
fect, be acting as the conduit for transfer payments from consumers in 
wealthy countries to consumers in poor countries.111  This is an entirely ap-
propriate way of integrating distributive values into a system designed to 
induce and reward innovation. 
b.  An International Fund for Innovation 
One should not underestimate the power of self-interested partnerships 
that exist between entities affected by the international intellectual property 
system, for these partnerships provide the basis for additional strategies of 
redistribution.  Some, indeed, are already being implemented.112   
Consider, for example, the interests of vaccine manufacturers.  Be-
cause economies of scale and scope limit their markets, it is often unprofita-
ble for vaccine manufacturers to produce vaccines unless they can expand 
their market.113  They must sell enough to get their average costs down, and 
this occurs only at very large volumes of production.  Moreover, because 
vaccines must be cooled throughout the distribution process, wide geo-
graphical distribution often requires expensive distribution channels or mul-
  
 110. This program could thus supplement the work already being done by the Global 
Fund for Medicines.  See The Global Fund Summary Report, supra note 62. 
 111. As the example in the text shows, the struggle is not really between multination-
al pharmaceutical companies and poor countries, the struggle is really between various clas-
ses of customers of the pharmaceutical companies.  The real issue is which group of consum-
ers should provide the incentive for the development of the pharmaceuticals and which group 
of consumers should have below cost access.  The pharmaceutical companies do not have a 
stake in the outcome of that debate as long as their incentive to make efficient investments in 
new products is not impaired.   
 112. Particular proposals for helping poor countries buy medicines are put forward in 
Mattias Ganslandt et al., Developing and Distributing Essential Medicines to Poor Coun-
tries: The Defend Proposal, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM 
RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 207 (Carston Fink & Keith Maskus eds., 2005), and Jeffrey 
Sachs et al., The Case for a Vaccine Purchase Fund (Center For Int’l Development, Harvard 
Univ., Working Paper, June 1999), available at 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/malaria/malaria.htm. 
 113. See Global Information, Inc., the-infoshop.com, The vertical markets research 
portal, Global vaccines market (2006), http://www.the-infoshop.com/study/fs37177-
vaccines.html (last visited June 10, 2007). 
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tiple production facilities.114  As a result, vaccines frequently go unmade 
even though the inventive phase of development has been completed.115 
Under these circumstances, the vaccine companies are the natural al-
lies of non-government and intergovernmental organizations that seek to 
help the people who need the vaccines but cannot afford them.  Moreover, 
vaccine companies have the ability to induce governments that have the 
wherewithal to help those who cannot afford vaccines to provide the fund-
ing.  It is in the self-interest of countries in which vaccine manufacturers are 
located to provide the funds that ultimately will help their companies.  In 
other words, providing the poor with money to buy the vaccines helps both 
the poor and the vaccine companies; the former get the medicine they need 
and the latter get the profits that would not be available if the poor were not 
helped to buy the vaccines. 
There is a kind of collective action problem here; synergies exist only 
if the correct coalitions can be put together.  A legitimate role for an interna-
tional institution would be to broker deals between the various stakeholders 
in order to find synergies between the interests of the poor and the interests 
of those who seek to serve the poor, including those who want to help the 
poor for altruistic reasons and those who stand to benefit if the purchasing 
power of the poor is increased.116 
2.  The Bargaining Solutions 
Reforming bargaining processes to adjust for misdistributions of bar-
gaining power is never easy.  In the international sphere it seems nearly 
impossible.  In domestic systems, policymakers may address maldistribu-
tions in bargaining power in several ways.  One way is to help those with 
little power (perhaps by subsidizing their participation in bargaining).  They 
may also facilitate coalitions designed to remedy bargaining power prob-
lems (for example, by recognizing the right to collective, rather than indi-
vidual, bargaining).117  Finally, they may constrain the outcome of bargain-
ing (for example, by making unconscionable agreements unenforceable).118  
  
 114. Path.org, Improving Service Delivery, http://www.path.org/vaccineresources/ 
service_delivery.php (last visited June 10, 2007). 
 115. Path.org, PATH: Making Injections Safer, 
http://www.path.org/projects/making_injections_safer.php (last visited June 10, 2007). 
 116. The World Health Organization and World Bank already perform this kind of 
coalition-building function.  See, e.g., The World Bank, worldbank.org (search “Vaccines 
Projects”) (describing some of the World Bank partnership projects).  
 117. This is the purpose of labor laws, for example, which facilitate collective action 
by giving it legitimacy and preventing some acts that would impede collective action.     
 118. This is, of course, a source of constrained bargaining in contract law.  Melvin 
Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, in PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT LAW 
300-05 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1995). 
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In the international system, no external body exists to implement such solu-
tions.  No court can rule an agreement to be one-sided, no legislature can 
encourage coalitions among the powerless, and no institution is in charge of 
subsidizing those who, by their knowledge or resources, cannot bargain 
effectively.  In the international system, if such techniques are to be used to 
redress bargaining power problems, the techniques must originate from the 
parties themselves, the very parties who have bargaining power and who 
have an incentive to use it.119 
Nonetheless, the techniques for addressing bargaining power imbal-
ances are not difficult to understand in abstract terms.  Putting to one side 
the question of why a country would agree to them, one must examine what 
techniques might work in the context of international intellectual property.  
One technique is to ask countries to bargain first over the goals and princi-
ples of the system, rather than over how the goals will be implemented.120  
One of the characteristics of TRIPS is that negotiations took place over the 
specific rules rather than over the goals of the system.  This meant that ne-
gotiators failed to focus on, or get agreement on, what they were trying to 
accomplish or on the basic principles by which they could determine wheth-
er they were successful.121  This, in turn, precluded the sense of a shared 
destiny and values that are important to positive sum outcomes.  
Where, by contrast, negotiators focus on the goals to be achieved 
through the negotiations and the principles that will be followed in con-
structing the new regime, the dynamics of the negotiation change.  First, 
there is a sense of shared destiny and values.  This would help to create a 
negotiation in which even zero-sum outcomes begin to be regarded as posi-
tive sum outcomes.  Second, when such negotiations occur, the parties in 
their negotiations can then appeal to the agreed upon goals and principles 
when they work out the details of the implementation.  This occurs in trade 
negotiations in the form of a common norm of openness and reciprocal ben-
efits.122 In effect, the goals and principles become constraints against which 
the negotiations are conducted, restricting the opportunism and self-interest 
that might otherwise skew the results of the negotiations. 
Admittedly, even negotiations over goals and principles are not likely 
to significantly constrain the use of bargaining power.  Negotiators who are 
  
 119. Peter M. Gerhart, Special Introduction, Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory 
—TRIPS as a Substantive Issue, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 357, 371 (2000).  
 120. Keohane, supra note 60, at 67. 
 121. To be sure, TRIPS contains a preamble and set of principles that seek to define 
the purposes of the agreement.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl & art. 1.  The princi-
ples are not consistent with each other however, and one gets the impression that they were 
drafted simply to reduce resistance to the agreement rather than to provide a guide for the 
negotiations.   
 122. PATRICK LOW, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 29 (1993) 
(discussing notions of fair trade and reciprocity in GATT negotiations).  
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attuned to their self-interest know of the goals and principles that will ad-
vance their self-interest.  Results-oriented bargaining will still occur.  None-
theless, the subtle difference between goal negotiation and implementation 
negotiation is likely to exert an influence that moderates the exercise of 
bargaining power, allows the development of a community of values, and 
equips the powerless to argue their case more persuasively. 
Moreover, an agreed upon statement of guiding goals and principles 
can constrain the negotiations in another way.  If, as is true at the WTO, the 
institutional design includes independent judicial review, then goals and 
principles can serve as a legal constraint on overreaching through bargain-
ing.  Such goals and principles would allow the WTO’s judicial branch (the 
Appellate Body) to interpret the treaties in a way that would be guided by 
the goals and values, overturning any application of the treaties that seemed 
to deviate from them.123 
A separate technique would involve delegating additional lawmaking 
authority to international dispute resolution.  One such proposal, for exam-
ple, would allow an institution like the Court of International Justice to take 
cases that sought to reconcile various principles of international law when 
law made in different regimes seems to clash.124  This would effectively 
subject policy made in the WTO to review under norms generated by re-
gimes that are friendlier to the needs of intellectual property users in inter-
national law.125  Such a proposal could therefore be seen to limit the range of 
rules that could be adopted through WTO forums. 
B.  The Practicality of Solutions 
The institutional design suggestions in Subsection II.A.1 require nego-
tiating countries to reorient their approaches to incorporate the system’s 
redistributive needs.  It is one thing to recommend new institutional designs; 
it is quite another thing to implement them.  Is there reason to believe that 
the nation-states of the world would accept such new and redistributive in-
stitutional arrangements? 
As was discussed above, designing institutions for distributive purpos-
es depends on inducing those countries that influence institutional design to 
recognize that their individual interest depends on the welfare of other coun-
tries.  Countries that define their interests exclusively in terms of consumers 
  
 123. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 8, 1998) (stating that GATT obligations 
are to be understood in the context of evolving environmental values).  
 124. See generally JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW:  HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003) (introduc-
ing a theory of how to bring coherence to various norms on international law).   
 125. Id. 
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and producers in their own country will necessarily be parochial and non-
distributive.  Their negotiating positions will necessarily ignore the impact 
of the policies they propose on other countries and on people in other coun-
tries, and will therefore emphasize either positive sum outcomes (with 
shared gains) or gains from zero-sum outcomes (that benefit themselves).  
On the other hand, countries that understand how their interests also must 
take into account the interests of those outside the country are likely to em-
brace redistributive solutions. 
Several trends suggest that policymaking for international intellectual 
property is likely to become more distributive over the coming decades.  
First, it is becoming apparent that international intellectual property regimes 
have important feedback effects on countries.126  International intellectual 
property harmonization increases national wealth for knowledge producers, 
to be sure, but it also binds national discretion and makes it more difficult to 
achieve a domestic intellectual property balance that is acceptable to both 
consumers and producers.  Recent scholarship, for example, has shown how 
the evolving international regime may well inhibit even countries that excel 
in knowledge production from achieving an appropriate balance in their 
domestic laws.127 
When that occurs, consumers of knowledge goods in the domestic 
market may well recognize that their interests are aligned with consumers of 
knowledge goods in other countries.128  For example, United States scien-
tists who object to the commoditization of factual information are likely to 
recognize that scientists in Europe and China share their concern.129  When 
they do, their interests are no longer the parochial interests of their country, 
but the transnational interests of other consumers of knowledge goods.  To 
the extent that those scientists have an impact on domestic policy toward 
international intellectual property, a country’s policy position is likely to be 
less parochial and more global. 
Second, large industrialized countries are not just producers of 
knowledge goods; they also consume knowledge goods.  To the extent that 
they follow their interests as producers of knowledge goods, countries ad-
vocate higher protection; but as consumers of knowledge goods, countries 
  
 126. Donald P. Harris, TRIPS’ Rebound: An Historical Analysis of How the TRIPS 
Agreement Can Ricochet Back Against the United States, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. &. BUS. 99, 110 
(2004).  
 127. See, e.g., Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property, supra note 
8 (analyzing the effects of TRIPS on ability of the United States to preserve open infor-
mation for research); Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, TRIPS Dynamics, supra note 8 (analyzing 
freedom of a country to decrease protection along one dimension while decreasing protection 
along a different dimension).   
 128. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS – Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (2004).  
 129. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 15, at 295. 
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worry that higher protection may in fact reduce their own room to innovate 
and decrease their national wealth by requiring large transfer payments to 
other countries.  A system that at one time looked to be advantageous be-
cause it increased national wealth may in fact come to be disadvantageous 
because it begins to decrease national wealth.  When that happens, a coun-
try’s perspective will change, and it will begin to see the international re-
gime through systemic, not parochial, lenses. 
Recent scholarship has pointed out, for example, that the very interna-
tional regime that the United States influenced in order to maximize its 
wealth from knowledge goods may in fact come to stifle the innovation on 
which the country’s future wealth depends.130  If that is true, and if it is rec-
ognized and projected into international arenas, then the United States may 
come to identify its interests not with the wealth that existing innovation can 
produce, but with the wealth that comes from remaining on the innovative 
cutting edge.  The United States may therefore become less parochial and 
more system-conscious in its orientation.  
Third, we have already seen how partnerships between knowledge 
producers and advocates for knowledge consumers can help to form allianc-
es that pressure governments to find a better balance in international intel-
lectual property law.  New forms of coalitions seem to be evolving in ways 
that may reduce the gaps between production and use.131  What is needed is 
the institutional framework within which such partnerships can flourish.  
Those frameworks are likely to grow as globalization, by spreading infor-
mation, increases awareness of the possibilities and decreases the distrust 
that keeps the partnerships from emerging. 
Finally, an important offshoot of globalization has been to begin a 
subtle refocus of individual identity from a national to a transnational orien-
tation.  Communications and transportation technology changes the sense of 
community, decreasing actual and virtual distance between “us” and 
“them.”  This makes it possible for individuals to identify with people who 
just a few decades ago would have been strangers, if they were even known 
at all.  Although most people still identify primarily with their nation-state 
on important issues, communications technologies are changing communi-
ties of interest so that an individual may identify more with the welfare of 
people in other countries than with neighbors in her own country. 
  
 130. See id. at 295-99 (suggesting that an over-regulated IP market may reduce the 
level of knowledge goods that can be produced in the future).   
 131. The developing country agenda at WIPO, for example, has been endorsed as part 
of the agenda at WIPO.  See Press Release, WIPO, Member States Agree to Further Examine 
Proposal on Development, WIPO Doc. WIPO/PR/2004/396 (Oct. 4, 2004), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2004/wipo_pr_2004_396.html (last visited June 10, 
2007).  The agenda of NGO is contained in the Geneva Declaration on the Future of the 
World Intellectual Property Organization, 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf.  
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This is, indeed, the lesson of the controversy over access to affordable 
medicines.  It will be recalled that as soon as TRIPS was adopted, the AIDS 
crises focused attention on the fact that the payments for patented medicines 
that TRIPS required would hamper the ability of countries to address the 
health needs of the patients.132  The international community responded in 
ways that effectively expanded the room that countries have to use the flex-
ibilities of TRIPS to meet the health needs of their people.  Although this 
effective revision in TRIPS resulted in part from international pressure and 
humanitarian instincts, it also reflected the ways that communities of inter-
est are being redefined from national to transnational levels.  AIDS activists 
in the United States identified with AIDS patients abroad, and the pressure 
that they put on the United States government to relax some of the TRIPS 
obligations was instrumental in shifting the political balance within the 
United States, and thus the position that the United States took on the rele-
vant TRIPS issues. 133 
CONCLUSION 
This Article suggests that the WTO negotiating forums are ill suited to 
make international intellectual property law because they cannot achieve an 
appropriate balance between the interests of innovators and consumers, tak-
ing into account disparities in wealth, both within countries and between 
countries.  The Article also outlines ways in which international institutions 
might be redesigned to achieve a better balance, and the reasons for believ-
ing that institutions might, over time, evolve in the recommended direction. 
We must focus on institutional design because international policy 
necessarily depends on the institutional arrangement that is used to make it.  
We therefore need to see whether our institutions of international lawmak-
ing are congruent with the goals to which they should be directed.  We 
need, in other words, to focus on the relationship between process and 
goals, with the goals fully specified to account for a complete measure of 
human welfare. 
In the case of intellectual property, the reality diverges from the ideal 
because intellectual property has been perceived too often to be a matter of 
efficiency only—that is, it is perceived to be only a matter of getting the 
incentives right.  Even on this basis, there is much to criticize in terms of the 
efficiency of international lawmaking.  However, this Article broadens the 
criticism in a new direction by arguing that the design of intellectual proper-
ty systems must necessarily take into account distributive, as well as effi-
ciency, values.  Once we recognize that distributive issues are implicit in 
  
 132. See supra note 61. 
 133. See generally Gerhart, supra note 52, at 1075. 
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intellectual property design, the gap between the actual and the ideal is larg-
er than even the critics of TRIPS recognize. 
Understanding the distributive issues buried in intellectual property 
design shows why the present institutional design for international policy-
making is unsatisfactory.  The institutional arrangement used to make inter-
national intellectual property policy has been one that is geared to increas-
ing the efficiency of the international system—one where cooperation nec-
essarily makes everyone better off.  For intellectual property, cooperation 
does not make everyone better off.  Some wealth must be shifted from con-
sumers to producers and some consumers must end up as net losers, while 
other consumers are net winners.  The only way that balance between win-
ners and losers can be struck is to explicitly recognize the distributive deci-
sions that must be made and design institutions that are equipped by institu-
tional mandate to make those decisions. 
Because the international system relies on each country to identify its 
interest in intellectual property and to advocate that interest in international 
negotiations, the search for balance in the system is replaced by a search for 
gains from the system.  That distorts intellectual property policymaking 
from a system designed to achieve balance to one designed to maximize 
returns.  In a system where bargaining power is not equally distributed, that 
has been a lethal formula. 
The only way in which this system can be changed toward the ideal is 
to redirect the interests of individual countries from parochial to systemic 
interests, so that each country recognizes that one of its interests is to take 
the interest of other countries into account.  This would shift the attention of 
countries from an exclusive focus on efficiency concerns to a focus on dis-
tributive values as well.  If that shift in focus were to be made, the institu-
tional arrangement for making global policy could easily be transformed 
into one that is better able to match the real with the ideal. 
